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PRE-DISPUTE MANDATORY ARBITRATION
CLAUSES IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS: THE CFPB’S PROPOSED
REGULATION AND ITS CONSISTENCY WITH
THE ARBITRATION STUDY
I. INTRODUCTION
“At all events, arbitration is more rational, just, and humane than
the resort to the sword.”1
Richard Cobden (1804-1865)
Such simple times are no more. Though long after Mr. Cobden’s
time, the debate over pre-dispute arbitration clauses has waged for
decades.2 Since the implementation of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts, financial services institutions (“FIs”)3 and consumer advocates
have been at odds over the vices and virtues of binding customers to
resolving disputes outside of the courtroom.4 In 2010, Congress initiated
new fodder for the debate.5 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which created the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), mandates that the
CFPB conduct a study of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in

1. RICHARD COBDEN, SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, VOL. 2, at 170 (John
Bright & James E. Thorold Rogers, eds., 1870).
2. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea of Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637, 642 (1996) (questioning
the use of arbitration in consumer contexts).
3. Throughout this Note “FI” refers to financial services institutions that serve
consumers and are subject to the CFPB rulemaking authority. See infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
4. Compare Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and
Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 267, 318 (1995) (twenty year-old article on the vices of pre-dispute arbitration), with
William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING. L. 213, 216
(1998) (articulating why banks should implement pre-dispute arbitration clauses).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2012).
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consumer financial products.6 Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB the authority
to limit or ban such clauses if it “is in the public interest and for the
protection of consumers,” but requires that the “[f]indings in such rule
shall be consistent with the [Arbitration Study].”7
In March 2015, the CFPB published the Arbitration Study
(“Arbitration Study”) called for in the statute, adding new fuel to the
seemingly endless and irreconcilable debate.8 The CFPB, in October
2015, took the “first step in the process of a potential rulemaking”9 and
presented a proposed regulation before a Small Business Review Panel
(the “Panel”).10 The proposed regulation bans class action waivers in predispute arbitration clauses and conditions the use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses on the submission of arbitral claims and awards to the
CFPB.11 The CFPB is also considering publishing the submitted data to
the CFPB website.12 The CFPB proposal relies on the Arbitration Study,
a 728-page report unparalleled by any research on pre-dispute arbitration
clauses to date—but will all this data resolve the pre-dispute arbitration
debate and support the CFPB’s proposed regulation?13
6. Dodd-Frank §§ 1011, 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5518(a).
7. Dodd-Frank § 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b). Dodd-Frank also grants the U.S.

Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) the authority to limit or ban pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in investment contracts, Dodd-Frank § 921(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o),
however, the SEC has yet to take any regulatory action in this area, George Friedman, CFPB
Issues Final Report on Arbitration, Telegraphing a Ban or Limits on Arbitration, SEC.
ARBITRATION ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/cfpb-issues-finalreport-arbitration-telegraphing-ban-limits-arbitration-sec-follow-suit/; Michael S. Barr,
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and Investor Contracts, 11 NYU J. L. & BUS.
793, 796 (SPECIAL ISSUE) 4 (2015).
8. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2015)
[hereinafter ARBITRATION STUDY].
9. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Considers Proposal to Ban Arbitration
Clauses the Allow Companies to Avoid Accountability to Their Customers (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-proposal-to-ban-arbitrationclauses-that-allow-companies-to-avoid-accountability-to-their-customers/.
10. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, 1, 5 (2015) [hereinafter SMALL
BUSINESS
REVIEW
PANEL
FOR
POTENTIAL
RULEMAKING],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packetexplaining-the-proposal-under-consideration.pdf; see also infra Part II, B.
11. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 13–
14.
12. Id. at 1, 13–14.
13. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Newark, NJ – Field Hearing on Arbitration,
LIVESTREAM, (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/2015/03/page/2/
(showing debate between consumer advocates and FI industry representatives when
Arbitration Study was released); see also Sharee Eriks & Baker Donelson, The CFPB’s
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This Note examines the CFPB’s proposed regulation and whether
it satisfies the statutory standards set forth in Dodd-Frank. Part II of this
Note addresses Congress’ mandate to the CFPB to conduct a study of predispute arbitration clauses and the CFPB’s process in conducting the
Arbitration Study.14 Part II also addresses the CFPB’s authority under
Dodd-Frank to limit or ban pre-dispute arbitration clauses, and describes
the Panel process and the proposed regulation.15 Part III evaluates the
proposed regulation under the statutory standards of public interest,
protection of consumers, and consistency with the Arbitration Study. 16
Part IV addresses potential challenges to the proposed regulation.17 Part
V suggests alternative regulation that is consistent with the Arbitration
Study, and challenges FIs to consider an opt-in pre-dispute arbitration
clause.18 Part VI concludes that only parts of the CFPB’s proposed
regulation should be adopted: first, the ban on class action waivers should
not be adopted; second, the proposed regulation conditioning the use of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses on the submission of data should be
adopted; and, third, publication to the CFPB website should not be
adopted.19
II. DODD-FRANK MANDATE TO CONDUCT A STUDY AND THE CFPB’S
AUTHORITY TO MAKE A RULE
A.

The Arbitration Study

The Arbitration Study is a product of the legislation that stemmed
from the 2008 financial crisis.20 Section 1028(a) of Dodd-Frank
mandates that the CFPB conduct a study of pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer financial products.21

Arbitration Study Sparks Vigorous Debate Over Next Steps in Regulating Mandatory
Arbitration
Clauses,
JD
SUPRA
BUS.
ADVISOR
(Sep.
28,
2015),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/flaws-and-all-cfpb-s-arbitration-study-76436/.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2012).
21. Dodd-Frank §§ 1011, 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5518(a).
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The Arbitration Study ordered in Dodd-Frank resulted in an
extensive report spanning 728 pages and incorporating findings from the
CFPB’s 2013 Preliminary Study of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.22
The Arbitration Study focused on six consumer financial markets: credit
cards, checking accounts, prepaid cards, private student loans, payday
loans, and mobile wireless third-party billing.23 The CFPB gathered and
examined data on arbitrations filed with the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”),24 individual lawsuits filed in federal court, class
action lawsuits filed in federal and some state courts, and class action
settlements.25 The bulk of the data for the Arbitration Study gathered was
from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2012, and was limited to
these six consumer financial markets.26
Beyond the arbitrations, federal individual lawsuits, class action
suits, and class action settlements, the CFPB also studied the features of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses and the degree of consumer knowledge of
such clauses.27 The CFPB studied the prevalence of these clauses in each
market, the length and complexity of each clause, and other clause
features.28 Via a telephone survey, the CFPB gauged consumer
22. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.3, at 9 (noting that the Arbitration Study
expands and updates some findings in the December 2013 Preliminary Study and that the
whole Preliminary Study is appended to the Arbitration Study as Appendix A).
23. Id. § 1.3, at 7.
24. The Arbitration Study focused on arbitration filings with the AAA, because the AAA
is the predominant consumer arbitration firm for financial products. Id. § 1.4.1, at 10. A
majority of arbitration clauses in financial products specify AAA as the arbitration
administrator. Id. § 2.5.3, at 35 (“Counting clauses in which the AAA was listed as at least
an option yields 83.3% of credit card arbitration clauses, 91.8% of checking account
arbitration clauses, 94.1% of prepaid card arbitration clauses, 88.7% of storefront payday loan
arbitration clauses, 66.7% of private student loan arbitration clauses, and 85.7% of mobile
wireless arbitration clauses.”). Two other arbitration administrators were mentioned in the
Arbitration Study—JAMS, Inc., formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, id. at App. A, at 168, and National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”)—both prominent
arbitration firms, but neither a source of arbitration data for the Arbitration Study. Id. § 2.5.3,
at 35.
25. Id. § 1.3, at 8.
26. Id. § 1.3, at 7. There are a few exceptions in the time-frame and in the markets
included in the study, first, data regarding individual federal lawsuits was narrowed to five
financial markets: checking accounts/debit cards, payday loans, prepaid cards, and private
student loans. Id. § 6.4, at 11. Second, data regarding class actions filed included class actions
over automobile loans. Id. Third, the class action settlement dataset was expanded to include
all consumer financial markets and the time period was increased to five years, from January
1, 2008, through December 31, 2012. Id. § 8.3, at 8.
27. Id. § 2, at 3.
28. Id. § 2, at 1. The clause features the CFPB studied included: opt-out option, small
claims court carve out, administrators and arbitrators, delegation, class action terms, relief
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awareness and understanding of arbitration clauses by inquiring whether
consumers understood their dispute resolution options and to what extent
dispute resolution options play into consumers’ choices between
financial products.29
B.

CFPB Authority Under Dodd-Frank and the Rulemaking
Process

Section 1028(b) of Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB the authority to
limit or ban pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses provided the limit
or ban satisfies three statutory standards.30 The CFPB must find that such
a rule is “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers,” and
is “consistent with the [Arbitration Study].”31 Acting on Dodd-Frank’s
grant of authority, the CFPB has taken the first step towards rulemaking
by submitting an outline of regulatory proposals to the Panel.32 The
Panel, which convened pursuant to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act (“SBREFA”),33 consists of representatives
of the CFPB, the Small Business Administration, and the Office of
Management and Budget, who meet with a selection of small business
entity representatives (“SERs”) potentially affected by the proposed
rule.34
The SBREFA consultation process allows the CFPB to determine
the impact of a proposal on SERs early in the rulemaking process. 35 SERs
provide the Panel with feedback regarding the economic impact of
complying with the proposed regulation, alternatives to the regulation,36

limits, time limits, confidentiality and nondisclosure, hearing location, costs, contingent
minimum recovery provisions, disclosures, and arbitral appeals process. Id.
29. Id. § 3, at 2.
30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
31. Id.
32. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 5.
33. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996 § 244, 5 U.S.C.
609(b) (2012) (addressing the impact of laws and regulations on small businesses that are
designed for larger businesses; not exclusive to CFPB rulemaking process).
34. 5 U.S.C. 609(b); SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING,
supra note 10, at 12–13.
35. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 10,
12.
36. Id. at 13. A list of discussion issues posed to SERs can be found at:
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-representatives-providing-
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and, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, whether the regulation will increase the
cost of credit to SERs.37 Once the Panel has convened, the Panel reports
to the CFPB within 60 days regarding how the proposed regulations may
impact small businesses.38 The CFPB will review the Panel report and
the feedback from the SERs before publishing the proposed regulation
and opening the public comment period.39
C.

The CFPB’s Proposed Regulation

The CFPB’s proposed regulation encompasses “consumer
financial products and services that the [CFPB] oversees, including credit
cards, checking and deposit accounts, certain auto loans, small-dollar or
payday loans, private student loans, and some other products and services
as well.”40 If finalized, the effective date of the rule would likely be 210
days after publication,41 as the CFPB is considering adding an additional
thirty days to the 180-day period set by Section 1028(d) of Dodd-Frank.42
The effective date will depend on feedback the CFPB receives from the
feedback-to-the-small-business-review-panel.pdf.
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1100G(a), 5 U.S.C. § 603(d) (2012).
38. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 13.
39. Id.
40. Richard Cordray, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, (Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter
Cordray 1], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-directorrichard-cordray-at-the-meeting-of-the-consumer-advisory-board/. The businesses potentially
affected are defined by Dodd-Frank in Section 1002 and limited by Sections 1027 and 1029
and include “but is not limited to banks, credit unions, credit card issuers, certain auto lenders,
small-dollar or payday lenders, auto title lenders, installment and open-end lenders, private
student lenders, providers of other credit in certain other contexts, loan originators that are
not creditors, providers of credit in the form of deferred third-party billing services, providers
of certain auto leases for at least 90 days, servicers of covered credit and auto leases,
remittance transfer providers, providers of domestic money transfer services or currency
exchange, general-purpose reloadable prepaid card issuers, certain providers of virtual
currency products and services, check cashing providers, credit service/repair organizations,
debt settlement firms, providers of credit monitoring services, and debt buyers.” SMALL
BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 23;
Dodd-Frank §§ 1002, 1027, 1029, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481, 5517, 5519 (2012).
41. SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note
10, at 22. Critics of the proposed regulation are suggesting to FIs to include an arbitration
agreements now to avoid those contracts from being subject to the regulation. See, e.g.,
Joseph L. Olson, et al., CFPB Takes Aim at Class Action Waivers, NAT. L. REV. (Oct. 26,
2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/consumer-finance-protection-bureau-takesaim-class-action-waivers.
42. SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note
10, at 17; Dodd-Frank § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(d).
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Panel regarding ability to and speed with which small businesses can
comply.43
The CFPB’s proposed regulation proceeds in two parts.44 The
first part precludes “pre-dispute arbitration agreements” from applying to
“class litigation.”45 This part of the regulation requires an FI to use
explicit language within an arbitration clause stating the clause does not
apply to cases filed on behalf of a class unless a court has denied class
certification or the class claims have been dismissed.46 In introducing the
regulation, the CFPB cited to securities industry precedent noting that the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) requires arbitration
clauses used by broker-dealers to disclaim the application of the clause to
class litigation.47 The CFPB further explained that, to ease compliance,
standard language would be created that FIs could adopt to meet this
requirement.48
The second part of the proposed regulation conditions the use of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses on the submission of arbitral data to the
CFPB.49 The requirement specifies that both initial claim filings and
written awards be submitted to the CFPB, so that it can understand and
monitor consumer arbitration awards.50 The CFPB noted that compliance
would not require any change in the conduct of arbitration proceedings
or the content of written awards.51
Also under consideration is whether the CFPB should publish
submitted arbitral data on its website.52 The CFPB noted that the
publication of arbitral data, like the ban on class action waivers, is not
unprecedented.53 Though, AAA and JAMs do not generally publish
claims or awards, California law requires arbitration administrators to
publish data on arbitrations involving consumer financial products and

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 22.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. FINRA has prohibited the application of arbitration clauses to class cases since
1992. Id. FINRA also serves as the arbitrator of broker-dealer arbitrations. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 5, 20.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 19–20.
53. Id. at 20–21.
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services.54 Furthermore, FINRA publishes “awards in disputes between
customers and broker-dealers” to its website, and AAA requires the
publication of awards in employment arbitrations and awards and filings
of any class arbitrations.55
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION
Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB’s proposed regulation of predispute mandatory arbitration clauses to be supported by a finding that
such limitation “is in the public interest and for the protection of
consumers” and that the findings are “consistent with” the Arbitration
Study.56 Applying the statutory standard to the first part of the proposed
regulation, the ban on class action waivers does not satisfy the statutory
requirement because the proposal is not consistent with the Arbitration
Study.57 Applying the statutory standard to the second part of the
proposed regulation, the requirement that FIs using pre-dispute
arbitration agreements submit arbitral data to the CFPB likely satisfies all
three of the statutory requirements, while the suggestion to publish such
data to the CFPB’s website is likely not in the public interest.58
A.

Banning Class Action Waivers in Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements

To consumer advocates, class action lawsuits are generally
viewed as a necessary tool to protect consumers,59 leveling the playing
field for individual consumers who may not have the means to engage an
attorney and likely do not have a claim large enough to allow an attorney
to take the case on contingency.60 To FIs, however, class actions do not
level the playing field, but rather give consumers a bigger stick.61
54. Id.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)

§ 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
57. See infra Part III.A.
58. See infra Part III.B, C.
59. Lauren G. Barnes, Congress Must Come to the Defense of Class Actions, LAW360
(August 21, 2015, 11:21 AM), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/aritcles/693335/congressmust-come-to-the-defense-of-class-actions.
60. Id.
61. Conrad Anderson IV & Gregory Cook, CFPB Arbitration Study May Be First Step
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Industry representatives point out that “[t]he cost to defend the most
frivolous [class action] complaint is overshadowed by the potential
exposure where these otherwise ‘minimal amounts’ are aggregated.”62
Accordingly, FIs settle class action cases rather than litigate even
unmeritorious claims to avoid discovery costs. 63 In fact, not even one of
the class action cases in the Arbitration Study went to trial.64
1. Meeting the Statutory Standard: In the Public Interest and for the
Protection of Consumers
In consumer financial products and services, the use of predispute arbitration clauses to ban class action lawsuits is widespread.65
The Arbitration Study found that tens of millions of consumers are
subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses66 and roughly 90% of those
clauses preclude a claim from moving forward on a class basis. 67 Most
consumers are subject to arbitration clauses through their credit card or
checking account agreements—products with the highest penetration in
the consumer financial market.68 The Arbitration Study found that while
many FIs do not include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their consumer
agreements,69 the FIs that do are larger institutions with a greater share of

in Unlocking Floodgates of Consumer Class-Actions, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 20,
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfpb-arbitration-study-may-be-first-49159/.
62. Id.
63. Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?, MAYER BROWN LLP 2–3,
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActi
onsBenefitClassMembers.pdf (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 445 n.3 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); JASON SCOTT JOHNSTON & TODD
ZYWICKI, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S ARBITRATION STUDY: A
SUMMARY
AND
CRITIQUE
6,
48
(Mercatus
Center
2015),
http://mercatus.org/publication/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-arbitration-studysummary-critique.
64. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.4, at 14.
65. Id. §§ 1.4.1, 2.5.5.
66. Id. § 1.4.1.
67. Id. § 2.5.5 (noting that “93.9% of credit card arbitration clauses, 88.5% of the
checking account arbitration clauses, 97.9% of the prepaid card arbitration clauses, 88.7% of
the storefront payday loan arbitration clauses, 100.0% of the private student loan arbitration
clause, and 85.7% of the mobile wireless arbitration clauses in [the CFPB’s] sample contained
terms that expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed on a class basis.”) (footnote omitted).
68. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: FACTSHEET (2015) [hereinafter
FACTSHEET],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitrationstudy.pdf.
69. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3, at 7 (noting only 15.8% of credit card
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the market.70 This explains why the number of consumers subject to
mandatory arbitration and prevented from participating in a class action
is still quite high.71 See Appendix A for the percentage of FIs that use
pre-dispute arbitration agreements listed by market and Appendix C for
the percentage of pre-dispute arbitration clauses that include class action
waivers.
The CFPB also found consumer comprehension of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses lacking or erroneous.72 The Arbitration Study showed
consumers do not consider dispute resolution when choosing between
different financial products or services.73 When surveyed, 54% of
consumers whose credit card agreements included a pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration clause did not know whether they could take their
credit card issuer to court or not.74 Thirty-eight percent of consumers
erroneously believed they could adjudicate their disputes in a court of law
either individually or as a class.75 Additionally, the CFPB found that
consumers are more likely to cancel a credit card or switch banks than try
to take the company to court (or arbitration) when a dispute arises or is
not otherwise resolved.76
In support of the proposed regulation, the CFPB highlighted the
prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration clauses that contain class action
waivers, the lack of consumer awareness and comprehension of the terms
of such clauses, and the low number of complaints that consumers have
filed against FIs.77 The CFPB maintains that class action waivers limit

issuers include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their card holder contracts).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 3.1, at 3–4.
73. Id. § 3.4.1, at 15. When surveyed, no consumer mentioned dispute resolution as an
influencing factor in his or her choice of credit card. Id. However, when the surveyor listed
potential factors and asked whether or not a factor influenced the respondent’s choice of credit
card, 31% of respondents agreed affirmatively that dispute resolution did influence his or her
choice. Id. The Arbitration Study noted that there was a high chance of acquiescence
response bias error in that percentage. Id. §3.4.1 at 15 n.37 (“Acquiescence response bias is
‘the tendency for survey respondents to agree with statements regardless of their content’ and
is particularly problematic with ‘agree-disagree’ questions.”) (citing Paul J. Lavrakas,
Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods, 2008.)
74. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 3. The Arbitration Study focused its
inquiry on credit cards, because credit cards have the highest penetration in the consumerfinancial market. Id. § 3, at 2.
75. Id. § 3.1, at 3.
76. Id. § 1.4.2, at 11.
77. Richard Cordray, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Cordray

2016]

REGULATING PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION

229

consumer relief and increase FI wrongdoing without lowering consumer
prices.78 To the CFPB, the proposed ban is in the public interest and for
the protection of consumers because it protects a consumer’s “day in
court” and empowers “private attorneys general” to fight against FIs
violating consumer protection laws.79
Critics of the proposed ban, however, believe that banning class
action waivers does not protect consumers.80 The real beneficiary of class
actions, according to FIs, is not the consumer who can bring the “minimal
amount[]” claim, but the attorney who is often paid 20% or more of the
class action settlement.81 In the wake of the proposed regulation, one
especially passionate attorney redubbed the CFPB the “Plaintiffs’
Lawyer Protection Bureau,” accusing the CFPB of prioritizing the needs
of plaintiffs’ lawyers over the needs of consumers.82
FI representatives, asserting the benefits of arbitration over class
action litigation, believe the proposed ban will limit consumers’ access to
arbitration.83 The proposal is being considered a “de facto ban” on all
arbitration clauses84 because FIs will “abandon” arbitration clauses if
class action waivers are prohibited.85 To FIs, the ban on class action
waivers is neither in the public interest nor for the protection of

2], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richardcordray-at-the-arbitration-field-hearing-20151007/; see also infra Appendix D listing the
consumer-FI individual filings in arbitration with the AAA, in federal court, and putative class
action cases filed in federal and some state courts.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Barr, supra note 7, at 812–813 (noting the “traditional use of private
litigation to enforce individual rights in the United States has become increasingly
supplemented with public enforcement”).
80. See, e.g., Joe Adler, Fierce Battle Ahead for the CFPB Arbitration Plan, AM.
BANKER, at 2, Oct. 8, 2015 (noting the head of the Consumer Bankers Association, Richard
Hunt, is “disappointed” with the CFPB for siding with trial attorneys).
81. Anderson, supra note 61. During the five-year span of the CFPB’s study of class
actions, the CFPB found that consumers were awarded $2.7 billion in relief and 18% of that
relief went to their attorneys. FACTSHEET, supra note 68; see also ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 8, § 1.4.7.
82. Andrew Pincus, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer Protection Bureau, INSIDEARM (Oct. 9,
2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.insidearm.com/daily/credit-card-accounts-receivable/creditcard-receivables/the-plaintiffs-lawyer-protection-bureau/.
83. Alan Kaplinsky, Our Thoughts on Director Cordray’s Comments to the CFPB
Consumer Advisory Board, BALLARD SPAHR CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. GROUP: CFPB MONITOR
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/22/our-thoughts-on-directorcordrays-arbitration-comments-to-the-cfpbs-consumer-advisory-board/.
84. Id.
85. Adler, supra note 80.
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consumers because it effectively robs consumers of a “quick, efficient
and inexpensive” means of dispute resolution.86 Furthermore, FI
representatives find no need for the ban when consumers who would
prefer no limitations in their dispute resolution options may select a
product or service that does not include a pre-dispute arbitration clause.87
FI representatives further critique the CFPB’s claim that class
action waivers increase FI wrongdoing—dismissing the belief that FIs
get a free pass when they are subject to “unprecedented regulation.”88 FI
representative Alan Kaplinsky “chided” Director Cordray for using the
term “free pass,” because he found the term “inflammatory and
misleading.”89
If taken at face value, the CFPB’s reasoning demonstrates that the
proposed ban satisfies the first and second statutory standards set forth in
Dodd-Frank: if class action waivers increase FI wrongdoing and prevent
consumer relief, then banning class action waivers is in the public interest
and for the protection of consumers.90 However, FIs would argue that the
ban is not in the public interest and for the protection of consumers,
because it would increase consumer prices or effectively eliminate an
efficient dispute resolution process for consumers, while benefiting class
action lawyers.91
In arriving at such diametrically opposed conclusions, both FIs
and the CFPB rely on the Arbitration Study.92 However, just because the
CFPB is relying on the Arbitration Study does not mean that the proposed
regulation is “consistent” with the Arbitration Study, as the third statutory

86. Kaplinsky, supra note 83.
87. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3, at 7 (noting only 15.8% of credit card

issuers include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their card holder contracts).
88. Rob Berger, The CFPB Declares War on Arbitration, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertberger/2015/10/18/the-cfpb-declares-war-onarbitration/3/.
89. Tim Bauer, No Surprises At the CFPB’s Arbitration Hearing, INSIDEARM (Oct. 8,
2015), http://www.insidearm.com/opinion/no-surprises-at-cfpbs-arbitration-field-hearing/.
90. Cordray 2, supra note 77.
91. See, e.g., Tina Orem, CFPB Proposal Could Strike Credit Unions, CREDIT UNION
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.cutimes.com/2015/10/24/cfpb-proposal-could-strikecredit-unions.
92. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky on behalf of Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Bankers
Ass’n, and Fin. Services Roundtable, to Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 3 (July 13, 2015), http://op.bna.com/bar.nsf/r?Open=jbar-9ydsbc; Cordray 2, supra
note 77.
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standard requires.93
2. Meeting the Statutory Standard: The Findings of Such Rule Shall Be
Consistent with the Arbitration Study
While the CFPB promoted the proposed regulation as consistent
with the Arbitration Study, FIs disagree.94 In the CFPB’s view, the major
finding of the Arbitration Study—and point of contention with FIs—is
that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses “restrict consumer relief in
disputes with financial companies by limiting class actions that provide
millions of dollars in redress [to consumers] each year.”95 In contrast, FI
representatives believe that the Arbitration Study demonstrates that
“[a]rbitration is faster, less expensive, and more effective than litigation,
including class action litigation, and [consumers] are far more likely to
obtain a decision on the merits and [receive] more meaningful relief.”96
Although the amount that FIs spend in class action settlements
and the number of “eligible” class members97 is high, perhaps these
numbers should not be accepted at face value.98 A factsheet published
alongside the Arbitration Study (“the Factsheet”)99 highlights that, from
2008 to 2012, 32 million consumers were eligible for relief in class action

93. See infra Part III.A.2; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
94. Compare Cordray 2, supra note 77, with Kaplinsky, supra note 83.
95. CFPB Study Finds that Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU:
NEWSROOM
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreementslimit-relief-for-consumers/.
96. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3; see JAMES R. MCGUIRE & NANCY
R. THOMAS, ELIMINATING ARBITRATION CLAUSES TO BENEFIT CONSUMERS, MORRISON
FORRESTER
(Oct.
20,
2015)
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/10/151020CFPBArbitrationRulemaki
ng.pdf (discussing how the CFPB’s report seems to show the benefits to arbitration over
litigation).
97. An eligible class member will not necessarily recover. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 8, § 8.3.3, at 27, 28 n. 46. Generally, an eligible class member is sent notification then
must make a claim for relief, though sometimes class members are identified and payments
are automatic. Id. Data on the claims rate in consumer financial class action settlements is
not easily accessible or documented in one place. Id. § 8.3.4, at 30. One class action
settlement administrator indicated claims rate was 5% while a different class action settlement
administrator had a higher rate of 40% or 50% of eligible class members claiming their relief.
Id. § 8.3.4, 30–31.
98. Compare FACTSHEET, supra note 68, with JOHNSTON & ZYWICKI, supra note 63, at 7.
99. FACTSHEET, supra note 68.
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settlements in federal court each year.100 Over the five-year period, 160
million consumers were eligible for relief, and settlement relief totaled
$2.7 billion.101 The factsheet also highlighted the unmeasured additional
relief that may have resulted from FIs changing their behavior.102
Notably, the $2.7 billion in total relief encompasses cash relief, in kind
relief, cy pres relief,103 and references the gross amount, before attorneys’
fees and costs are subtracted.104 Furthermore, FI representatives argue
that these numbers are not predictive of future class settlement payouts.105
The class settlement data included a handful of extra-large class action
cases that skewed the data by substantially increasing the number of
eligible class members and the amount of recovery. 106
When considering the benefits of class action settlements to
consumers, the Arbitration Study highlighted that 60% of class actions
brought are settled with the individual claimant, providing no relief to the
other class members.107 Where class members did recover, FI
representatives highlight the low amount of individual recovery,
especially when compared to individual recovery in arbitration. 108 The
Arbitration Study showed that cash payments in class action settlements
equaled $1.1 billion109 which, divided between 34 million class members,
reflects an average individual recovery of $32.35.110 By comparison, the

100. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This number is based on the class settlement data, which
included all consumer financial class settlements, not just the six markets, and thus is perhaps
not a helpful or equal comparison. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8, at 2. This number
seems to have no bearing on whether those “eligible” consumers had agreed to arbitration
clauses. Id.
101. FACTSHEET, supra note 68.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Cy pres relief is relief paid to charitable organizations on behalf of class members.
Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?, supra note 63, at 6.
104. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.1, at 4, § 8.3.5, at 32.
105. JOHNSTON & ZYWICKI, supra note 63, at 7.
106. Id.; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.3.2, at 15, n.36.
107. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.
108. Id. at 4.
109. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.1, at 4, n.5. Total relief, which include cash,
in-kind, cy pres, and attorneys’ fees. FACTSHEET, supra note 68. Cash relief “includes cash
payments to class members, debt forbearance for class members, and class expenses and fees
paid for by defendants as part of the settlement. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.1, at
4, n.5. For 28 settlements that provided for a cy pres payment for the benefit of class members
but no payment directly to class members, cash relief also includes the amount of the cy pres
payment. Id. In kind relief refers to FIs giving free or discounted access to a service, such as
credit monitoring. Id.
110. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 4.
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average individual recovery in arbitration was $5,389.111
In order to conclude that class actions provide superior relief to
consumers over arbitration, the CFPB did not compare average individual
recovery, but instead compared overall class settlement recovery to the
arbitration data.112 However, such arbitration data is based solely on
arbitral awards—decisions made by an arbitrator on the merits—as
opposed settlements agreed upon between parties.113 During the threeyear time period of the Arbitration Study, 1,847 arbitrations were filed.114
Only 32% of those arbitration cases ended in an arbitral award with a
decision on the merits.115 Less than 25% of the arbitrations settled and
the remainder were not clearly resolved—either deemed dormant or
perpetually pending.116 In cases where the arbitration reached a decision
on the merits, consumers recovered just under $400,000,117 far less than
the $2.8 million in arbitral awards recovered by FIs.118 However, these
amounts do not include consumer relief in up to 66% of arbitrations that
settled.119 Furthermore, the Arbitration Study noted that the low amount

111. Id.
112. Richard Cordray, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 10, 2015) [hereinafter

Cordray 3], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-directorrichard-cordray-at-the-arbitration-field-hearing/; FACTSHEET, supra note 68; see also
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.6, at 32, § 8 (addressing the outcome of arbitrations
studied and the value of class settlements respectively).
113. FACTSHEET, supra note 68.
114. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.2.1, at 9. This number includes arbitrations
filed by the consumer, the FI, or mutually submitted. Id.; see also infra Appendix D.
115. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.2.1, at 9.
116. Id. The Arbitration Study noted that 34% of the arbitrations not clearly resolved
showed signs consistent with settlement, raising the likely percentage of settled arbitrations
to 66%. Id. § 5.2.2, at 11.
117. Id. (“The total amount of affirmative relief awarded was $172,433 and total debt
forbearance was $189,107.”).
118. Id. § 1.4.3, at 12; FACTSHEET, supra note 68. The amount of arbitral awards to
consumers compared to the amount of arbitral awards to FIs may not be so astounding when
the type of dispute is considered. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.3, at 12. In 227
of the 244 of the cases where FIs made claims or counterclaims, arbitrators awarded relief to
the FIs for a total of $2.8 million. Id. However, 40% of all of the arbitrations filed were
disputes over debts, id., and the cases where FIs were awarded $2.8 million were
“predominantly for disputed debts.” FACTSHEET, supra note 68. The question then remains,
is it so surprising that the outcome over such disputes is consumers having to pay what they
owe? ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.3. Perhaps still troubling is the percentage
of wins FIs have over consumers in these cases, but that issue raises a worrisome allegation
that the AAA is not a neutral arbitrator, which is not a light accusation nor supported by the
Arbitration Study data or incorporated in the CFPB finding. See Cordray 3, supra note 111
(emphasizing the difference in recovery).
119. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.2.2, at 11, 13.
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of consumer recovery in arbitral awards likely reflects FI settlement
strategy.120 Since an FI is more likely to settle a claim where the
consumer has a strong chance of winning, the arbitral award data is not
indicative of total consumer recovery.121 Thus, looking at arbitral awards
versus class action settlements is an apples-to-oranges comparison,122
which fails to establish that the ban on class action waivers is “consistent”
with the Arbitration Study.123
The CFPB also reasoned that pre-dispute arbitration clauses that
ban class action waivers do not lower consumer prices.124 However, the
Arbitration Study established that proving a correlation between
arbitration clauses and pricing is near impossible.125 The Arbitration
Study noted that arbitration provides cost saving to FIs.126 Whether by
reducing court costs and attorneys’ fees inherent in extensive discovery
and litigation, or by limiting an FI’s exposure to aggregated claims, predispute arbitration clauses likely save FIs money. 127 The CFPB looked
to whether these cost savings are passed through to consumers—
attempting to probe the argument that consumers benefit from pre-dispute
arbitration clauses even when consumers are unaware of the clauses’
existence.128 The CFPB recognized the difficulty in proving the “passthrough” effect because so many factors affect pricing. 129 Moreover,
even if a correlation between lower prices and pre-dispute arbitration
clauses were found, it would not be dispositive of a relation between the
two because of the multitude of factors affecting pricing.130
Lastly, the CFPB’s proposal to ban class action waivers is likely
not consistent with the Arbitration Study because it relies on conclusions

120. Id. § 5.1, at 6. The CFPB recognized the limitation in its data by noting that
“[b]ecause [its] ability to review substantive outcomes is generally limited to arbitration
decisions on the merits, the substantive outcomes of most consumer financial arbitration
disputes are unknown and largely unknowable to reviewers.” Id.
121. Id.
122. JOHNSTON & ZYWICKI, supra note 63, at 7.
123. MCGUIRE & THOMAS, supra note 96, at 2.
124. Cordray 2, supra note 77.
125. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 10, at 2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 10, at 3–4.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 10, at 2.
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never addressed in the Arbitration Study.131 The Arbitration Study found
that many consumers do not resort to arbitration or litigation when a
dispute arises with an FI, but did not address why this is the case.132 The
CFPB has drawn the conclusion that consumers are not filing individual
suits or arbitration claims against their FIs either because consumers think
their claims are too small to be worthwhile or because the harm imposed
on consumers by FIs is going undetected.133 There could be truth in the
CFPB’s speculation, but theorizing why claims are not being filed may
not give the CFPB the authority to ban class action waivers—just because
the Arbitration Study is not inconsistent does not necessarily render it
consistent.134 For the proposed ban on class action waivers to be
consistent with the Arbitration Study, further research must be done to
definitively establish the CFPB’s conclusions.135 At this point, the
proposed ban should not be adopted.136
B.

Conditioning the Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements on
the Submission of Arbitral Claims and Awards to the CFPB

Conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements on the
submission of arbitral claims and awards to the CFPB satisfies the first
and second statutory requirements set forth in Dodd-Frank.137 It is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers to collect further data
regarding consumer arbitration based on the prevalence of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses and the lack of consumer awareness and
comprehension of the terms of such clauses.138 By requiring companies
to provide data on arbitral claims and awards, the CFPB believes it can
monitor individual arbitration for unfairness.139 Even FIs agree that the
131. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 14;
see also MCGUIRE & THOMAS, supra note 96, at 2 (“Nor does the [Arbitration Study] seem to
support its conclusion that consumers benefit from class litigation any more than they do from
individual arbitration.”).
132. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.2, at 11.
133. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 14.
134. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
135. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 4.
136. Id.
137. Dodd-Frank § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).
138. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.1, at 3.
139. Cordray 2, supra note 77. In support of the need to monitor arbitration for potential
unfairness to consumers, the CFPB and consumer advocates make reference to the
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CFPB should conduct further research.140 The submission of arbitral
claims and awards is less research than FIs desire, but it is a move toward
filling the gaps in the Arbitration Study. 141 Critics may argue that the
proposed regulation would increase consumer prices because the cost of
the proposed regulation may be passed through to consumers; however,
since the CFPB is not requiring any change in the arbitral proceeding or
written rewards the cost is likely limited.142
Additionally, this section of the proposed regulation likely

controversial history of the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”). See SMALL BUSINESS
REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 19; CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, LIVESTREAM, supra note 13 (warning against repeat NAF debacle). NAF was
accused of being overly FI-friendly, resulting in unfair arbitral results for consumers.
Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 111th Cong. (July 22, 2009) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney, Public
Justice) (“NAF pursued the business of debt collection arbitrations by cultivating relationships
with and the favor of creditors, fundamentally to the detriment of consumers.”). Previously a
significant consumer arbitration firm, NAF stopped arbitrating consumer disputes. Matthew
R. Salzwedel & Devona Wells, National Arbitration Forum Settlement with Minnesota
Attorney General, 1 ST. AG TRACKER, 4 (2009). “[NAF’s] decision to end its consumerarbitration business resulted from a settlement it reached with the State of Minnesota less than
a week after the [State] Attorney General [] sued the company . . . accusing the company
of violating Minnesota’s consumer-fraud, deceptive-trade-practices, and false advertising
statutes.” Id.; see also SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra
note 10, at 19 (noting the allegations arose from the firm’s common ownership with a number
of FIs involved in the arbitration).
140. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3. Some of the areas FI representatives
requested the CFPB investigate further include customer satisfaction with arbitration, cash
awards to individual members of a class, the economic consequences to customers and
companies if pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses are banned, whether recent United
States Supreme Court cases which make it harder to receive class certification limit the
amount of relief class actions could potentially provide, the impact of the CFPB’s own
enforcement actions, and customer experience with arbitration in areas where arbitration has
had the chance to develop further, such as employment. Id. There is also a potential for
unfairness when arbitrators are chosen for their specialty in the field; connection to the
industry tends towards finding in favor of the industry. See Barr, supra note 7, at 811. A
recent study showed that arbitrators chosen for their specialty in securities had a “significant
impact” on the arbitral award. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator
Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43 (2014)).
141. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.
142. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 20.
A reevaluation may be required after the Panel process, as such a limited cost may still prove
too great for some small businesses, and undermine the public interest of this section of the
proposed regulation. See James H. Carter & John V. H. Pierce, Have Class Arbitration Found
New
Life?
NY
L.
J.,
Nov.
16,
2015,
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202742253268/Have-Class-Arbitrations-FoundNew-Life?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL (noting arbitral data submission may prove
“significant expense for small businesses”).
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satisfies the third statutory requirement.143 Though the absence of data
does not render the ban on class actions waivers consistent with the
Arbitration Study, less data or missing data is consistent with the proposal
to collect more data.
C.

Publishing Arbitral Claims and Awards to the CFPB Website

The CFPB couched the possibility of publicizing arbitral data to
its website in the second part of the proposed regulation—it did not
introduce it as a separate and distinct proposal.144 However, the finding
for this part of the regulation is different and likely does not meet the
second or third statutory requirement of Dodd-Frank.145
The CFPB maintains that publication will add an extra layer of
consumer protection by shedding “the sunlight of public scrutiny” on FIconsumer arbitration.146 Citing its current practice of publishing
consumer complaints on its website, the CFPB reasons that “greater
transparency of information” improves customer service and helps
“identify patterns in the treatment of consumers, leading to stronger
compliance mechanisms.”147
Despite this benefit to consumers,
publishing arbitral claims on the CFPB’s website may not be in the public
interest and for the protection of consumers.148
A cited benefit to arbitration is the private nature of the process.149
While the CFPB and others see this as a negative,150 suggesting it allows
FIs to conceal wrongdoing, 151 the element of confidentiality may well be
in the public interest because it protects an FI’s reputation against

143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
144. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 19.
145. Dodd-Frank § 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a).
146. Cordray 2, supra note 77.
147. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 20,
n.57.
148. See Amy Schmitz, Assuming Silence In Arbitration, 268 N.J. LAWYER 16, 17 (2011)
(noting one potential benefit of privacy in arbitration is to prevent public embarrassment or
humiliation).
149. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010)
(noting that a class arbitration proceeding eradicates the benefit of privacy in arbitration).
150. See e.g., Barr, supra note 7, at 809 (noting that the lack of transparency in arbitration
is problematic, because consumers have a harder time understanding why the arbitrator
arrived at a decision or proving that the arbitrator misapplied the law).
151. Cordray 2, supra note 77; Barr, supra note 7, at 810.
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potentially baseless accusations. Where data regarding disputes concerns
a depository institution, the FI’s reputation may affect consumer
confidence, which could in turn affect a consumer’s choice to deposit
with that institution.152 The CFPB would argue that this “public
spotlight” is a positive outcome because it keeps FIs in line,153 but not all
juicy headlines are indicative of actual FI behavior and the continued
erosion of consumer confidence in FIs may not be in the public interest.
FIs would argue further that publicizing arbitral data is less for
the protection of consumers and more for the protection of plaintiffs’
attorneys.154 Providing easy access to arbitral claims would likely
increase the number of class actions brought against FIs.155 Anyone
looking to bring a claim need only pull up the CFPB website and see what
claims are hot right now.156 This part of the regulation adds support to
the FI representatives’ position that the proposed regulation benefits
plaintiffs’ attorneys—and not consumers—and, therefore, should not be
adopted.
IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSED REGULATION
Critics of the proposed regulation speculate that the CFPB lacks
the authority to ban class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clauses,
not because of a failure to satisfy the statutory standards, but because the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) prevents it from doing so.157
Without a congressional amendment to the FAA, critics insist the CFPB’s

152. See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and The Banking System, 35 AM.
U. L. REV. 647, 667 (Spring 1986) (arguing for the continued separation of commercial and
investment banking, but noting the connection between consumer confidence and health of
depository institutions).
153. Cordray 1, supra note 40, at 2.
154. Adler, supra note 80.
155. See ANTHONY E. DIRESTA, BRIAN J. GOODRICH, RACHEL E. MUELLER, HOLLAND &
KNIGHT LLP, CLIENT ALERT: CFPB PROPOSES LIMITS ON COMPANIES’ USE OF ARBITRATION
CLAUSES (2015), https://m.hklaw.com/publications/cfpb-proposes-limits-on-companies-useof-arbitration-clauses-10-22-2015/ (recommending companies “consider their new exposure
to class action litigation”).
156. See id. (noting publication of arbitral awards on the CFPB website highlights
“prohibited business practices”).
157. Id.; Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Jessica Karmasek,
The Legality of CFPB’s Plan for Proposed Ban on Arbitration Clauses in Question, LEGAL
NEWS LINE (Dec. 4, 2015) http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510649484-legality-of-cfpb-splan-for-proposed-ban-on-arbitration-clauses-in-question.
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proposed regulation would contravene the statute.158 The FAA specifies
that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”159
The response to the contravention challenge is that Dodd-Frank
supersedes the FAA and is the congressional amendment critics
demand.160 Section 1028(b) of Dodd-Frank explicitly provides that the
CFPB “may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an
agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute
between the parties.”161 A court determining the validity of the CFPB’s
proposed regulation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements would look to
Dodd-Frank, not the FAA, as Dodd-Frank is an act of Congress
subsequent to the FAA and explicitly addresses arbitration.162
Critics may argue that Congress’ grant of authority to the CFPB
regarding arbitration is “an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to
an agency.”163 The argument being that it is impermissible for Congress
“to transfer to others the essential legislative function with which it is thus
vested”164—in this case, the power to amend the FAA. 165 The standard
158. Karmesek, supra note 157.
159. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
160. Jeff Sovern, Experts Disagree Over Whether the Earth is Flat and CFPB Has the

Authority to Regulate Arbitration Clauses, PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct.
19, 2015), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2015/10/experts-disagree-over-whether-earthis-flat-and-cfpb-has-power-to-regulate-arbitration-clauses.html.
161. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
162. Sovern, supra note 160; see also Barr, supra note 7, at 817.
163. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Responding to Professor Sovern: How Dodd-Frank Section 1028
limits the CFPB’s Power to Regulate Arbitration Agreements, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CFPB
MONITOR (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/22/responding-toprofessor-sovern-how-dodd-frank-section-1028-limits-the-cfpbs-power-to-regulatearbitration-agreements/; Marc James Ayers, Can the CFPB Really Prohibit Pre-dispute
Arbitration Agreements? BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP: FINANCIAL SERVICES
PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 26, 2015) https://www.financialservicesperspectives.com/2015/03/canthe-cfpb-really-prohibit-pre-dispute-arbitration-agreements/ (raising the unconstitutional
delegation of power argument regarding a total ban of arbitration, before the October 2015
rule was proposed).
164. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
165. See Ayers, supra note 163 (describing a potential ban on consumer-financial
arbitration clauses as a repeal of the FAA).
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for evaluating a delegation challenge is whether, in delegating its power,
Congress guided the agency’s discretion with “intelligible principles.”166
This is a very permissive standard.167 Since the inception of the
intelligible principle standard in the New Deal era, when the Supreme
Court invoked the standard to strike down three laws in three cases, the
Supreme Court has yet to find any other laws that fail to provide an
intelligible principle.168 Facing such a permissive standard, the unlawful
delegation argument seems unlikely to gain traction.169
Both sides recognize, however, that the current Supreme Court
favors arbitration.170 In AT&T Mobility LLC. v Concepcion,171 the
Supreme Court enforced the arbitration clause by holding that the FAA
preempted a California doctrine that found certain arbitration clauses that
contain class actions waivers unconscionable.172 Most recently, in Direct
TV Inc. v. Imburgia,173 the Court reemphasized its holding in Concepcion
and held that even where the terms of the arbitration clause rely on the
“laws of your state,” those laws, and the validity of the arbitration clause,
are still subject to the FAA and federal preemption.174 Furthermore,
between Concepcion and Imburgia, in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant,175 the Court held an arbitration clause containing a
166. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 335 (4th ed. 2011) (citing Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Nat’l Cable Television Assoc. v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974)).
167. See id. (“In more than 60 years since . . . Schechter, not a single federal law has
been declared an impermissible delegation of legislative power.”).
168. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 16 n.100 (1998) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–12 (1936);
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529–42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–30 (1935)).
169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 166 at 336 (noting the “strong consensus over the last
half century in favor of allowing broad delegations of legislative power to administrative and
regulatory agencies of all types) (footnote omitted); Jeff Sovern, Will the Industry Attack the
Constitutionality of the CFPB’s Power to Regulate Arbitration Clauses?, PUB. CITIZEN:
CONSUMER
L.
&
POL’Y
BLOG
(Apr.
16,
2015),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2015/04/will-the-industry-attack-the-constitutionality-ofthe-cfpbs-power-to-regulate-arbitration-clauses.html (asserting a lack of expertise in
constitutional law, but finding little weight in the argument that the CFPB lacks the power to
regulate).
170. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (enforced
arbitration clause); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311–12 (2013)
(enforced arbitration clause).
171. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.
172. Id. at 1752.
173. Direct TV Inc., v. Imburgia, No. 14-462, slip op (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015).
174. Imburgia, slip op at 10-11.
175. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304.
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class action waiver as valid and enforceable under FAA notwithstanding
a showing of financial hardship on the plaintiff.176
Despite the Court’s favorable treatment of arbitration clauses, the
predicted FAA challenge177 and the unlawful delegation argument will
likely not prevail.178 By granting the CFPB the authority to limit or ban
pre-dispute arbitration clauses, Congress shifted its previous stance and
created an exception to the FAA’s general enforcement of arbitration
clauses.179 Unlike Concepcion or Imburgia, the challenge is not of state
law but federal regulation.180 Based on history, the unlawful delegation
argument will have little bite.181
V. ALTERNATIVES
The Arbitration Study data window—January 1, 2010, through
December 31, 2012—is especially interesting, because Concepcion was
decided in 2011.182 Dismayed at the holding, consumer advocates
worried that Concepcion would result in the inclusion of a pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration clause in every consumer contract because FAA
preempted state law regarding arbitration.183 However, based on the data
gathered from 2012 and 2013 in the Arbitration Study, the Concepcion
holding has been just a ripple in the rise of arbitration clauses, compared
to the tidal wave consumer advocates feared.184
Concepcion, however, did leave its mark.185 Many of the
consumer-friendly features of current pre-dispute arbitration clauses are
attributed to Concepcion.186 The commercial response to the Concepcion

176. Id. at 2311–12. The plaintiff failed to convince the Court that he should be able to
bring a class action claim when the cost of “individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim”
would cost him more than he could possibly recover. Id. at 2307, 2312.
177. Adler, supra note 80.
178. Sovern, supra note 160.
179. Id.
180. AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011); Direct TV Inc., v.
Imburgia, No. 14-462, slip op (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015).
181. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 166, at 336
182. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
183. Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 844–
48 (2012).
184. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3.1.
185. Gilles, supra note 183, at 844–46.
186. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Gilles, supra note 183, at 825.
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Court’s praise of the consumer-friendly features—such as covering filing
fees and providing cash bounties—was to add these features to their own
arbitration clauses sua sponte to mirror the arbitration clause upheld in
Concepcion.187
A.

Alternative Regulation

Despite the post-Concepcion increase of consumer-friendliness,
the Arbitration Study demonstrates that improvement is still needed in
reducing the complexity and increasing consumer awareness and
comprehension of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.188 Clause complexity,
length, and features vary across the six consumer financial markets.189
Generally, arbitration clauses tend to be more complex and require a
higher grade level of education to understand than the rest of the
contract.190 For example, the average Flesch Kindcaid grade level 191 for
arbitration clauses in credit card agreements is 15.6 while the rest of the
contract is 11.8.192 Interestingly, larger FIs’ arbitration clauses are longer
but less complex (average Flesch Kincaid grade level: 14.7) than smaller
FIs’ arbitration clauses, which are shorter but more difficult to
comprehend (average Flesch Kincaid grade level: 15.7).193
One of the common arbitration clause features identified in the
Arbitration Study, besides the class action waiver, is the opt-out option.194
Twenty-five percent or more (depending on the market) included an optout feature in the arbitration clause.195 Typically, an opt-out option
allows a consumer thirty days to choose not to be subject to the arbitration
clause by mailing a signed document to the issuer stating the choice to

187. Gilles, supra note 183, at 844–46.
188. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, §§ 2.4, 3.1 (noting the complexity and lack

of consumer awareness respectively).
189. Id.; see also infra Appendix B and C (chart of clause features).
190. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4, at 28; see also infra Appendix B (listing
the Flesch Kincaid grade levels for each markets’ contracts and arbitration clauses).
191. As described in the Arbitration Study, the Flesch Kincaid grade level takes into
account total words, total sentence, and total syllables and based on the readability, determines
what level of education a reader would need to understand the clause. ARBITRATION STUDY,
supra note 8, § 2.4, at 28 n.79.
192. Id. § 2.4, at 28.
193. Id. at Appendix A, at 28 (defining large FIs as the twenty largest issuers).
194. Id. § 2.5.1, at 31.
195. Id.
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opt out.196 Despite the prevalence of the opt-out option, the CFPB found
most consumers are unaware of its existence,197 a fact that renders the
consumer-friendly provision relatively toothless. See Appendix C for a
chart of the common features and their prevalence in pre-dispute
arbitration clauses by market.
Instead of banning class action waivers, the CFPB should create
a standard pre-dispute arbitration clause that is easier to understand and
includes the following features: (i) an opt-out option, and, where hardship
is demonstrated, (ii) a provision that FIs will cover arbitration costs.198
Furthermore, the standard clause should protect the judicial oversight of
class actions by containing an anti-severability provision in the class
action waiver, which would prevent a case from moving forward as a
class arbitration.199 The benefit of each of these features will be discussed
in turn.
1. Consumer-Friendly Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clause
i. Opt-Out Option
An opt-out option should be included in every mandatory predispute arbitration clause200 and the consumer should be able to opt out
online or via telephone.201 The provision should allow that a consumer
196. Id.
197. Id. § 3.1, at 4. The CFPB encountered only one consumer (out of the 1,007 survey

respondents, id. at §3.3, 9) who had been made aware of his ability to opt out, and who, despite
his awareness, chose not to opt out. Id. § 3.4.3, 21 n.44.
198. There are more consumer-friendly features that FIs could adopt and some have
already adopted including: choice of arbitrator, minimum contingent recovery, and small
claims court carve outs. Id. at § 2. The importance of allowing a consumer to select the
arbitrator helps avoid potential bias toward FIs. See Barr, supra note 7, at 811 (noting the
existence of bias when the arbitrator has a background in the industry of the dispute).
199. Id. § 2, at 46. The proposed regulation does not prevent a consumer from choosing to
move forward on a class basis through arbitration instead of through the court. SMALL
BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 18. The CFPB could
investigate additional judicial oversight feature, namely, an anti-delegation clause, requiring
the enforceability of an arbitration clause to be determined by a judge not an arbitrator. See
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.4 (addressing anti-delegation). The intricacies of
such a proposal would require another Note to explore.
200. See Barr, supra note 7, at 817 (noting disclosure and an opt-out option in arbitration
agreements as necessary to protect consumers, but further that the CFPB and the SEC should
also protect consumers’ ability to seek collective relief).
201. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, §§ 2.4, § 3.4.3, at 21, n.44 (noting the current
use of opt-out options in pre-dispute arbitration clauses and the lack of consumers that opt

244

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 20

has a minimum of thirty days to opt-out, which the FI may increase at its
discretion.202 While this may increase an FI’s exposure to class actions,
it ameliorates the lack of negotiation power on the part of the
consumer.203 Since the Arbitration Study did not find a single person who
opted-out of the arbitration clause, the effectiveness of the opt-out option
should go hand-in-hand with increasing consumer awareness and
understanding of arbitration clauses.204 In reality, and as demonstrated
by the Arbitration Study, most consumers will likely choose the default
option rather than opt out; thus, the exposure to FIs and the benefit to
consumers would both be quite limited.205 To decrease the number of
consumers who do not opt out because of inertia, the opt-out provision
should allow consumers to either opt out online or via telephone.206
ii. FI Covers Arbitration Costs
The CFPB should require FIs to cover the filing costs of
arbitration when a consumer shows financial hardship. The Arbitration
Study demonstrates a wide variation in cost allocation.207 Some predispute arbitration clauses provide that the FI will cover the initial filing
fees, while others provide that the FI may cover filing fees upon request,
under special circumstances, or if the arbitration administrator has been
asked and has refused to waive the initial filing fee.208 Other clauses
provide that the losing party will pay all of the arbitration costs of the

out).
202. Id. § 2.5.1, at 31 (noting that current opt-out windows range from 30 to 90 days).
203. See id. § 3.2, at 7–8 (noting the lack of understanding and awareness consumers have

of their credit card agreements).
204. Id. § 3.1, at 4. For an alternative that addresses the toothlessness issue of an opt-out
option see supra Part IV.B, suggesting an opt-in option.
205. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4; Steve Lohr, The Default Choice, So Hard
to Resist, NY TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, BU5 (citing RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE
(2008)); Michael S. Barr, et al., Behaviorially Informed Financial Services Regulation, NEW
AM.
FOUND.
9,
13
(Oct.
2008)
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sendhil/files/behaviorally_informed_financial_services_regu
lation.pdf (exploring opt-out options in different services and products within the financial
services industry).
206. Requiring the opt out option to be online or by telephone is based on the Author’s
personal experience with extra steps usually adding to consumer inertia and an increased
likelihood that consumers will “choose” the default option if opting out is too difficult. See
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 205, at 87– 89 (highlighting the power of the default option).
207. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.10.
208. Id.
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prevailing party.209
The low cost of arbitration is, arguably, a benefit to both
consumers and FIs.210 The cost is lower than litigation because in
arbitration counsel is not required,211 parties are not battling with the
“crowded court dockets,” and, generally, discovery and motions practice
are of shorter duration.212 Where, however, a consumer is unable to
afford even the lower cost of arbitration and is bound by a pre-dispute
arbitration clause, the FI should have to cover the costs of arbitration.
Because class actions provide consumers an upfront cost-free option to
bring claims against FIs, equity requires consumers bound to arbitration
also have the ability to resolve their disputes even when they do not have
the economic means.213
2. Opportunity for Judicial Review: Anti-Severability Provision
To avoid a case moving forward as a class arbitration, the CFPB
should condition the use of arbitration agreements on the inclusion of an
anti-severability provision in the class action waiver.214 The antiseverability provision would specify that if a court deems the class action
waiver in an arbitration clause unconscionable or otherwise
unenforceable, then the whole arbitration clause is stricken from the
contract and parties can move forward as a class in court.215 Were a court
allowed to strike just the class action waiver of an arbitration clause, then
the class could move forward as a class in arbitration.216
The reasons to avoid class arbitration were articulated by the

209. Id.
210. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.
211. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.10. Though representation is not required

in arbitration the Arbitration Study showed on average 62% of consumers were represented
by counsel. Id. § 5.5.3, at 29. Some critics of arbitration argue that the low cost benefit is
lost when the parties hire representation. Barr, supra note 7, at 809.
212. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Litigation: Arbitration v. Litigation, INSIDE COUNSEL (Apr.
19,
2012),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/04/19/litigation-arbitration-v-litigation
(noting that speed, the collegial nature, and confidentiality are also benefits of arbitration).
213. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 59 (articulating that class actions even the playing field
to consumers without the economic means).
214. Id. § 2.5.5, at 46 (explaining the commonness and use of anti-severability provisions
in pre-dispute arbitration clauses).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Supreme Court in Concepcion.217 Class arbitration is nearly an
oxymoron, because it so thoroughly negates the benefits of arbitration.218
Because of the number of parties in a class arbitration, the process is
inevitably slower, less efficient, and less private then individual
arbitration.219 Furthermore, the Concepcion Court highlighted that
arbitration is a poor forum in which to deal with the complexity of class
certification.220 Arbitration lacks the appellate review process that
protects the high stakes of the parties—whether high in number of class
members or high in exposure to an FI.221 Therefore, conditioning the use
of arbitration clauses on the incorporation of an anti-severability
provision to the class waiver keeps class actions in the courtroom and out
of arbitration.222
3. Use of A Standard Clause Would Decrease Complexity
Finally, the Arbitration Study highlights that pre-dispute
arbitration clauses are more complex than the rest of the contract in most
consumer financial products.223 This should be addressed and could be
mended with the creation of a standard clause, similar to the standard
forms and clauses the CFPB has already promulgated for other activities
in the consumer financial services industry. 224 Without addressing the
understanding and awareness issues, consumer-friendly conditions
suggested (like the inclusion of an opt-out option) would remain as
toothless as the status quo.225

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 352–53.
Id.
See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.5, at 46 (noting the effect of an antiseverability provision).
223. Id. § 2.4.
224. E.g., G–1–Balance Computation Methods Model Clauses (Home–Equity Plans), 12
C.F.R. 1026, App. G (2012).
225. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.2. Even though approximately a quarter of
arbitration clauses contain an opt-out option, the CFPB only found one consumer who had
been made aware of his option to opt out and who opted not to. Id. § 3.4.3, 21 n. 44.
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4. The Alternative Regulation Under the Statutory Standards Set Forth
in Dodd-Frank
The incorporation of features that increase consumer-friendliness
and opportunity for judicial review as a condition to the use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses is in line with the statutory standards set forth in DoddFrank. The standard clause with these added features is in the public
interest and for the protection of consumers, because it allows FIs to
continue to limit exposure to meritless class actions but not without
certain checks to insure fairness to consumers. The consumer may opt
out or, if the consumer did not opt out, pursue arbitration even if he or
she cannot afford the costs. Arguably, these measures would increase
costs to FIs, which may in turn raise prices for consumers. However,
compared to the potential exposure of banning class action waivers the
costs would be limited.226
Conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is also
consistent with the Arbitration Study. The Arbitration Study highlighted
pre-dispute arbitration clause complexity and a need to improve
consumer awareness and comprehension.227 The Arbitration Study also
established that consumers have a choice.228 Despite the extensive use of
arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts, there are a significant
number of FIs that do not include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their
consumer contracts.229 Furthermore, the Arbitration Study demonstrated
that, on average, individual consumers recover more in arbitration than
in class actions.230 Thus, conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration
on these protective features, instead of banning class action waivers, is
consistent with the Arbitration Study.
B.

Proactive FI Alternative: Voluntary Opt-In Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Clause
There is one final suggestion that would be most daring for FIs,

226. See, e.g., Orem, supra note 91 (recognizing the increased costs for credit unions in
defending against class action cases if the proposal is adopted).
227. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4.
228. Id. § 2.3.
229. Id.
230. See supra Part III.A.iii.
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and that is to include the arbitration clause as an opt-in option.231
Offering an opt-in option would prove the strongest display of the FI’s
belief in the benefits of arbitration to consumers and ultimately be an endrun on the CFPB’s proposal. By necessity, opt-in arbitration clauses
would be consumer-friendly to entice consumers to agree pre-dispute to
arbitration. To be an enforceable contract, the clause would have to
provide consideration, which could be, inter alia, a partial rebate on the
price paid for the product, a lower interest rate, a promise to pay dispute
resolution costs (arbitration costs), or a contingent minimum recovery.232
Since consumers most typically choose the default option, the enticement
to get consumers to opt in would need to be high.233 However, the benefit
would spread beyond the increased consumer-friendly arbitration clause.
By default, an opt-in arbitration clause would alleviate the lack of
consumer awareness and understanding, while continuing to recognize
the benefits of arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the proposed regulation—and to some degree prior
to it—anti-arbitration arguments have gained public traction.234
However, public sentiment is not sufficient support for an agency
regulation. Further, parts of the proposed regulation fail to satisfy the
statutory standards set forth in Dodd-Frank.235 The proposed regulation
to ban class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clauses is not
consistent with the Arbitration Study. 236 Publishing the arbitral data to
the CFPB website is likely not in the public interest or for the protection
of consumers.237 Conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration
231. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LIVESTREAM, supra note 13 (streaming Alan
Kaplinsky’s argument that arbitration is beneficial consumers).
232. If an arbitrator decides for the consumer in an award higher than the FIs last
settlement offer, the contingent minimum recovery guarantees a consumer a certain set
amount of money. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.11. In the arbitration clause at
issue in Concepcion, the contingent minimum recovery to the consumer was $10,000. Id.
(citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 n.3 (2011)).
233. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 205, at 87– 89.
234. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebelhoff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, NY TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, A1 (presenting a view against
arbitration).
235. See supra Part III.A., C.
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. See supra Part III.C.
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agreements on the submission of arbitral claims and awards, however,
satisfies the statutory standards, and should be adopted as a rule.238
Instead of banning class action waivers, the CFPB should create a
comprehensible, standard, consumer-friendly pre-dispute arbitration
clause.239 In the event that the proposed regulation to ban class action
waivers is adopted, an FAA contravention challenge will most likely be
raised.240 However, a court addressing the validity of the regulation will
likely turn to Dodd-Frank, not the FAA, which will provide an intelligible
principle to the CFPB and not be an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.241
Ultimately, the consumer-FI relationship is mutually beneficial,
despite how starkly FIs and consumer advocates disagree on the topic of
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration.242 As a final suggestion, FIs could
choose to be proactive instead of resisting the CFPB, and create their own
solution, even if it may sound like an oxymoron—a voluntary pre-dispute
arbitration clause.243
BRENNA A. SHEFFIELD

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part V.
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APPENDIX A
PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
MARKET
Credit Card Agreements

% of AGREEMENTS WITH PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES

244

53%

Checking Account Agreements

44%

Prepaid Card Agreements

92%

Private Student Loan Agreements
Payday Loan Agreements

246

Mobile Wireless Contracts

245

86%
99%
88%

244. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3, n.21.
Four defendants [Bank of America, Capital One, Chase, and HSBC,] in the Ross antitrust
litigation settled claims by agreeing not to use arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts
for three and one-half years. 05-Civ. 7116 (Southern District of New York). The credit card
loans outstanding of the Ross settlers constituted 86.4% of the outstandings not subject to
arbitration clauses. If the settling defendants in Ross had continued to use arbitration clauses,
93.6% of credit card loans outstanding would be subject to arbitration clauses. None of the
Ross settlers has resumed using arbitration clauses as of February 2015.
Id. § 2.3, n.21.
245. FACTSHEET, supra note 68 (noting the Arbitration Study focused on the “largest”
student loan lenders—not all).
246. This percentage is based on payday lenders in California and Texas, seemingly the
only places where the CFPB was able to gather data on payday loans. FACTSHEET, supra note
68.
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APPENDIX B247
FLESCH KINCAID GRADE LEVELS
MARKET

AVERAGE FLESCH KINCAID
GRADE LEVEL FOR
ARBITRATION CLAUSE

Credit Card
Checking Account
Prepaid Card
Private Student Loan
Payday Loan
Mobile Wireless

15.6

AVERAGE FLESCH
KINCAID GRADE LEVEL
FOR REST OF THE
CONTRACT
11.6

—

—

15.0

11.8

—

—

15.4

13.0

—

—

APPENDIX C248
ARBITRATION CLAUSE FEATURES
include class
arbitration
waiver

INCLUDE
OPT-OUT
OPTION

INCLUDE
SMALL
CLAIMS
COURT
CARVE OUT

Includes
ANTI DELEGATION
clause

INCLUDE FI
WILL COVER
SOME OR
ALL FILING
FEES

99.9%

26%

99%

42%

43%

Checking
Accounts

97%

38%

91%

22%

16%

Prepaid Cards

100%

26%

94%

26%

31%

Private Students

98%

84%

99%

28%

29%

—

—

—

—

—

99%

14%

99%

15%

0%

MARKET

Credit Cards

Payday Loans
Mobile Wireless
Contracts

247. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4 (location of data regarding Flesch Kincaid
grade level).
248. Id. § 2 (location of data for Appendix C).
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APPENDIX D
COMPARING ARBITRATIONS AND LAWSUITS
TYPE OF
CASE

Arbitration

249

Individual
Federal
Lawsuits

1,847

3,462

251
259

Class
actions

Total
filed
20102012

258

562

AVERAGE
TOTAL
TOTAL FI
DECIDED SETTLED UNKNOWN
AVERAGE
CONSUMER RECOVERY
ON
FI
INDIVIDUAL
MERITS
CONSUMER RECOVERY RECOVERY From decision
RECOVERY
From decision on the merits
on the merits
32%
25%
57%
$12,500
$361, 540
$2,806,662
250
$5,400
82 casesonly 1 went
through trial
0

48%

252

25%

42%

35%

253

260

254

—

$32.35

261

255

—

—

256

—

n/a

257

—

n/a

249. Id. § 5.2.2.
250. Id. (location of data regarding arbitrations filed and resolutions). The recovery

averages are based solely on the cases where a decision was reached on the merits by an
arbitrator, however, they are even further limited because not all of the decisions detailed the
awards. Id.
251. Id. § 6.5.2 (location of data regarding federal individual cases).
252. Id. § 6.2.2. The data regarding outcomes and claim amounts is based only 1,250
suits—not all of the individual federal lawsuits filed. Id.
253. The CFPB noted that though the outcome was unknown, it was consistent with
settlement, so these cases likely settled. Id.
254. The majority of individual federal cases settled and did not detail recovery. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at § 6.5.1 (location of data regarding class action cases).
259. 470 class actions filed in federal court plus 92 class actions filed in state courts
selected for the study. Id.
260. Data indicates these cases were individually settled. Id. § 1.4.4.
261. This figure is from FI representatives. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at
4. The CFPB’s method used to determine class member recovery was an aggregation that
was then divided, there is not data regarding actual recovery by individual class members.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.3.3.

